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Aesthetics of Theory in the
Modernist Era and Beyond
Antoine Cazé
1 “What  is  the  productive  tension  between  ‘poetics’  and  ‘poetry’  as  these  terms  are
currently  used?”  asks  critic  Maria  Damon.1 In  much  the  same  way,  this  issue  of
Transatlantica intends to focus on the tensions, frictions, and contradictions between
poetic  writing and aesthetic  discourse,  between practice and theory.  In The Futurist
Moment, Marjorie Perloff shows how “[t]he novelty of Italian Futurist manifestos […] is
their brash refusal to remain in the expository or critical corner, their understanding
that the group pronouncement, sufficiently aestheticized, can, in the eyes of the mass
audience, all but take the place of the promised art work.”2 Building upon this premise
of early, pre-World-War-One Modernism—which crucially contributed to blurring the
boundaries  between  artwork  and  critical/theoretical  commentary—the  five  articles
gathered here under the heading “Aesthetics of Theory” undertake to study how the
aesthetic  dimensions  and determinants  of  Modernist  “theoretical”  writings  may be
characterized.  In  their  overall  strategy  to  emphasize  formal  innovation,  American
writers  such  as  Ezra  Pound,  Gertrude  Stein,  Hilda  Doolittle  and  T.S.  Eliot  tried  to
integrate  the  programmatic,  prescriptive  dimension  of  poetic  theory  within  their
poetic  practice,  thereby  challenging  what  Perloff  calls  “the  expository  or  critical”
mode.  Conversely,  many of  these writers’  creative pieces explore,  and often reveal,
theoretical/critical probes into poetic idioms—a feature which is even more obvious in
the domain of other art forms such as music or architecture (one immediately thinks of
Arnold Schoenberg or Mies van der Rohe), here illustrated by the poetic/theoretical
practice of John Cage.
2 To  analyze  T.S.  Eliot’s  apparently  clear-cut  distinction  between  poetry  and  theory,
manifested  in  what  has  been petrified  into  critical  commonplaces,  Amélie  Ducroux
starts from the poet’s mock authoritative declarations in his essays and shows how his
poetry produces its own forms of theoretical and critical discourse, premised not so
much on the conservative attempt to obey the lessons of the “quiet-voiced elders” as
on debunking the very precepts it seems to support in the first place. If one takes into
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account the ironical relationship between his critical writings and his poems, Eliot’s
aesthetics thus appears to be much more dynamic and plastic than merely prescriptive.
Ducroux first looks at Eliot’s allusive appropriation of past texts, seeing it as a literal
putting into practice of the idea, famously formulated in “Tradition and the Individual
Talent,” according to which works of the past are altered by any new addition to them.
The organic integration of aesthetic theory into poetry itself—here in the guise of more
or  less  explicit  quotations—serves  to  call  into  question  the  metaphorical  nature  of
Eliot’s ideas, blurring the usual distinction between discursive modes: here, the poetry
is literal, incarnating theoretical gestures in the poetic voice, while the theory remains
metaphorical.  Ducroux then shows how such incarnation of theory in Eliot’s  poems
goes beyond what she also calls an “expository mode” in order to permeate syntactic
and grammatical  strategies;  she suggests that Eliot’s  poetic practice allowed him to
worry the distinction between expression and intention, and demonstrates how forms
of  theoretical  thinking  actually  “take  place”  in  the  poems,  allowing  “the  sensory
experience of poetry and the experience of thought itself” to coalesce.
3 Although one can hardly imagine two more radically opposed writers than T.S. Eliot
and  Hilda  Doolittle,3 Antoine  Cazé’s  contribution  also  makes  of  blurring  discursive
modes a  crucial  writing strategy in both the poetic  and theoretical  writings of  the
latter. As a matter of fact, Cazé argues that this blur is constitutive of H.D.’s poetic
theorizing,  as  he retraces how H.D.  gradually defines an alternative form of  clarity
which may be identified as “clarid” rather than clear, if one is to adopt the poet’s own
unusual  term.  In  this  respect,  H.D.’s  contribution  to  the  aesthetics  of  theory  is  to
rematerialize theory, re-embodying it by grounding it in the senses rather than in the
mind. Focusing on the early “para-theoretical” essay Notes on Thought and Vision (1919,
published 1982), Cazé unpacks H.D.’s palimpsest uses of a theory—layered and erased—
which  she  profoundly  alters  to  fit  her  larger  poetic  agenda.  Theory  is  no  longer
envisaged  as  an  exercise  in  conceptualization  or  ideation,  but  rather  as  a  form  of
heightened  vision  (the  word  “theory”  itself  deriving  from  a  Greek  root  meaning
“observe, contemplate”), one of whose models may be psychoanalysis, which played
such an important role in H.D.’s exploration of the workings of the mind, alongside
spirituality and the occult. What H.D. seeks to foreground, in her poems as well as in
her essays, is “the perceptual dimension of her theorizing,” which implies working in a
perpetually liminal space, a transitional state of mind and feelings which she calls “the
over-mind” (Notes on Thought and Vision), or a “clarid sequence of ideas” (Borderline).
4 In “The Politics of Aesthetics: Ezra Pound’s ‘Jefferson’ is ‘Mussolini’,” Hélène Aji chooses
another  angle  of  approach  from  which  to  deal  with  the  question  of  aestheticizing
theory  in  the  Modernist  era,  as  she  discusses  the  nexus  of  political,  aesthetic  and
theoretical forces framing Pound’s two versions (English and Italian, respectively) of
his  propagandist  text,  Jefferson  and/or  Mussolini and  Jefferson  e  Mussolini.  There,  Aji
contends, “Pound puts into practice a theory whereby aesthetics informs the politics of
an era, as much as it is informed by it.” In a characteristically Poundian emphasis on
the materiality of language as having a direct impact on reality, the Italian version of
this  text—a sometimes approximate translation from the English original—acts as a
focal  point,  a  strange attractor  of  sorts  which allows for  Pound’s  “radicalization of
previous  political  and  aesthetic  strategies.”  In  her  reading  and  deconstruction  of
Pound’s  political  pamphlet  through  a  wide-ranging  discussion  of  recent  Pound
criticism,  Aji  shows  how  Pound’s  agenda  consisted  in  “turn[ing]  his  aesthetics  of
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politics  into a  politics  of  aesthetics,”  a  move which reinforced the American poet’s
attempt at actually changing the world thanks to the poetic word.
5 Such a materialism, by which thought and ideas are projected into linguistic shapes, or
language objects,  also lies at the core Gertrude Stein’s writing practice, although in
very different ways than in Pound’s case, obviously. In “The Tune of Thinking,” Abigail
Lang discusses Stein’s four 1935 lectures gathered under the title Narration in order to
show  how  thought  may  unfold  simultaneously  in  writing  and  in  speech,  thus
transforming  the  ways  in  which  the  mind  processes  it.  For  Stein,  writing  practice
always  precedes  any  theory  of  writing,  so  that  thought  is  exposed to writing  even
before it  can exposed in writing.  That  is  why looking at  her  rather hastily  written
lectures  on  Narration—in  which  she  tries  to  work  through  what  she  sees as  the
“problem” of narrative—may give us a first-hand glimpse into the thought processes
Stein was so intent in probing throughout her texts. The “problem” of narration is that
it  forbids  immediacy  because  it  must  create  retrospective  distance  in  order  to  be
perceived as producing a narrative at all; narration does not allow for presentation,
only for representation, and therefore cannot account for processes of thought and
knowledge. As Lang argues, Stein’s Narration is a key text in understanding how Stein
relates thought/knowledge to writing,  since “[e]nacting what they say,  the lectures
seek to bridge the discrepancy between the immediate nature of knowledge and the
gradual nature of narrative.” In a sense, this brings us back to what was central in T.S.
Eliot, too—i.e., the difficulty which confronts any theory seeking to shun the expository
mode by attempting, on the contrary, to “write itself,” in the immediacy of thinking
(rather than thought), without writing itself off, so to speak.
6 The potential immediacy of a theory that would embrace a sense of its own aesthetics,
and the consequences this specific theoretical stance may have upon textual practice,
also  lie  at  the  core  of  Vincent  Broqua’s  reading  of  John  Cage’s  experimental  book
provocatively entitled Silence. “How is one to rediscover the link binding aesthetics and
experience?”  Broqua  asks,  implying  the  broader  question  of  what  remains  of
perception and sensation in aesthetics.  For,  as  he suggests,  Silence is  both a book of
aesthetic theory and a book in which a peculiar, and peculiarly Cagean, aesthetics is put
into practice, more than reflected upon, thus defeating both the domain of experience
(practice) and the domain of thinking about this experience (theory), or at the very
least worrying the limit between the two. The very structure of Cage’s book—for which
Cage himself  says he is  not responsible—stages this  productive defeat twice:  firstly,
through Cage’s claim of its non-intentionality; and secondly, by shifting the burden of
theory away from the more obviously expository pieces (such as the famous “Lecture
on Nothing”), and onto those texts in the book which appear to be less theoretical, little
anecdotes or stories which allow “an experimental aesthetics of criticism to be truly
experienced.”
7 In her essay “A Common Sense,” the American poet and critic Lyn Hejinian, admittedly
a postmodern successor  of  Gertrude Stein,  gives  the following definition of  theory:
“Theory  ‘consists  in  seeing  connections.’  And  this  is,  indeed,  different  from  what
practice does—which is to make connections, to forge links. Theory asks what practice
does and in asking, it sees the connections that practice makes. Poetic language, then,
insofar as it is a language of linkage, is a practice. It is practical. But poetry, insofar as it
comments  on itself  (and poetic  form is,  among other  things,  always  a  poem’s  self-
commentary)  is  also  theoretical.”4 By  creating  this  hybrid  category  of  “practical
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theory” for poetic language, Hejinian points at what all the essayists featured in this
issue have tried to assess—i.e., the ways in which writers, when thinking about their art
from within the aesthetic limits framing this art, set out to propose alternative ways of
actually (re)constructing common sense, or rather a common sense as Lyn Hejinian
puts  it  in  the title  of  her essay.  A sense that  would not  be based on unquestioned
consensus but which would use inquisitive thinking as a way to construct the space of
what may be shared among several people, a space which would then be made up of all
the traces of what has been questioned in common. The substantive shift from general
category  (“common  sense,”  with  no  article)  to  particular  experience  (“a common
sense,” with the indefinite article extracting from the unquestioned generality of the
category one class, which in this instance points to a truly experienced commonality) is
crucial: such is the kind of linkage which theory may effect when it is concerned with
processes  and  acts  rather  than  mere  elucidation  and  discourse.  In  another  of  her
essays, entitled “Reason,” Hejinian specifies what is meant by theory along the same
lines:
The term theory appears twice in the essay as a synonym for thought, but I mean
thought of a particular kind—thought that is rigorously speculative, ongoing, and,
by virtue of looking out toward the world as well as self-critically inward, it resists
adherence  to  first  principles,  immutable  truths,  authoritarian  formulations.
Theory, as I  understand it,  is always everywhere mutable. It  is the interminable
process by which we are engaged with the changing world around us and made
ready for the changes it requires in and from us. A theory, then, is not a theorem
[…]. Theorizing is, in fact, the very opposite of theorem-stating. It is a manner of
vulnerable, inquisitive, worldly living, and it is one very closely bound to the poetic
process.5
8 “Ongoing,”  “mutable,”  “interminable  process,”  “inquisitive”:  according  to  Hejinian,
theory—if  it  remains  at  the  limit  between  inward-looking  and  outward-looking,
between seeing and making—is essentially another name for poetry. Such a definition
was made possible  by the various ways in  which the American Modernists  allowed
aesthetic theory to shift and very progressively merge with poetic practice, giving birth
to an aesthetics of theory that more recent poets such as Hejinian were able to turn
into a practice of living.
NOTES
1. Maria Damon, “The Poetics of Poetry. Can these Bones Live?” In Michel Delville & Christine
Pagnoulle, eds., The Mechanics of the Mirage. Postwar American Poetry, Liege, Liege Language and
Literature, 2000, p. 125.
2. Marjorie Perloff,  The Futurist Moment:  Avant-Garde,  Avant-Guerre,  and the Language of Rupture,
Chicago, The U of Chicago P, 1986, p. 85 (my emphasis).
3. About Eliot’s conversion to Anglicanism, H.D. comments in a 1935 letter to Bryher: “T.S. Eliot is
so, so terribly wrong—yet is saving his skin, I suppose simply. . . . H.D. tries to remain in the
balance  between  these  two  vibrations.”  Bryher  Papers,  Beinecke  Rare  Book  and  Manuscript
Library, GEN MSS97, Box #14, Folder 568.
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